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Abstract For a given premium, enhanced annuities pay higher pensions to policy-
holders with impaired health. Even though risk classification is a common concept in
the insurance sector and should allow insurers to increase their profitability, enhanced
annuities are rarely offered outside of the United Kingdom. The paper provides a
general method of determining an optimal risk classification system for enhanced
annuities that will maximize an insurance company’s profits. The cost of risk clas-
sification, as well as that incurred when insureds are assigned to inappropriate risk
classes (a chief component of underwriting risk), are explicitly considered.
Zusammenfassung „Enhanced-Annuity“-Versicherungsverträge zahlen ceteris pa-
ribus höhere Renten an Versicherungsnehmer mit reduzierter Lebenserwartung. Ob-
wohl Risikoklassifikation (hier: in Abhängigkeit der Lebenserwartung der Versicher-
ten) im Versicherungssektor eine überaus übliche Vorgehensweise ist und grundsätz-
lich dazu führt, die Profitabilität des Versicherungsunternehmens zu steigern, fin-
den sich „Enhanced-Annuity“-Kontrakte ausserhalb von Grossbritannien nur sehr
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selten. Die vorliegende Arbeit leitet ein Risikoklassifikationssystem für „Enhanced-
Annuity“-Verträge für ein Unternehmen ab, das den erwarteten Gewinn maximieren
möchte. Dabei finden sowohl Risikoklassifikationskosten als auch Kosten von Fehl-
klassifikationen Berücksichtigung.
1 Introduction
For a fixed premium, enhanced annuities pay higher pensions to individuals with
impaired health.1 Except for the U.K. market, where enhanced annuities are well
established, in most countries this type of contract is rarely offered. For instance, only
around 4% of annuities sold in the U.S. market are based on enhanced rates,2 and to
the best of our knowledge, only one insurer in Germany sells enhanced annuities.
It is not obvious, why the substandard annuity market is so small, given that the
concept of risk classification is widely used in different insurance business lines to
improve company profitability.3 Furthermore, enhanced annuities would make pri-
vate pensions available to a broader range of the population and thus improve re-
tirement income for insureds with impaired health. Hence, there must be important
reasons behind the reluctance of many insurers to enter the substandard annuity mar-
ket.
This paper summarizes the main findings of a working paper written by Gatzert et
al. (2008) that was presented by Nadine Gatzert and Gudrun Hoermann at the annual
meeting of “Deutscher Verein für Versicherungswissenschaft e. V.” in Berlin, March
2009. The idea of the paper is to develop a general model to determine an optimal
risk classification system4 for enhanced annuities that will maximize an insurance
company’s profits. The costs of risk classification, as well as those of insufficient risk
assessment (an important part of an insurer’s underwriting risk) that can be incurred
when insureds are assigned to inappropriate risk classes, are taken into account. This
aspect is crucial, as underwriting risk is considered the most significant risk fac-
tor in the issuance of enhanced annuities. In this paper, two strands of literature are
interwoven—that on enhanced annuities and that on risk classification. From an in-
surer’s viewpoint, the problem of optimal risk classification for enhanced annuities is
solved by taking into consideration classification costs and underwriting risk.
There are several factors that affect the profitability of selling enhanced annu-
ities. First, a reasonable classification system must be established based on insureds’
life expectancy. Second, adequate underwriting guidelines are necessary to ensure
that applicants are assigned to the proper risk class. These guidelines need to take
1See LIMRA and Ernst and Young (2006, p. 10). Enhanced annuities, impaired life, and care annuities
are all subsumed within what are known as “substandard annuities” (for a detailed description, see Gatzert
et al. 2008). In the U.K. market, all types of substandard annuities are sometimes referred to as enhanced
annuities.
2See LIMRA and Ernst and Young (2006, p. 18).
3For a detailed explanation, see Doherty (1981).
4According to Actuarial Standard of Practice No. 12, a risk classification system is a “system used to
assign risks to groups based upon the expected cost or benefit of the coverage or services provided” (Ac-
tuarial Standards Board 2005).
Optimal rate classification for enhanced annuities 567
into consideration such factors as medical conditions or lifestyle factors, including
smoking, weight, geographical location, education, and occupation. Third, the costs
of such classification—e.g., for advanced studies estimating the applicant’s life ex-
pectancy based on age, medical condition, and lifestyle factors—need to be taken
into consideration when pricing the contract. Finally, demand for the product is de-
termined by the annuity amount paid to insureds in each risk class and thus an insurer
needs to consider the market competition effects that may result from its use of a
specific risk classification system.
Section 2 provides an overview of the literature on enhanced annuities and risk
classification. In Sect. 3, we describe the process of optimal risk classification under
profit maximization in the context of enhanced annuities. A calculation of classi-
fication costs is presented, accompanied by an estimate of underwriting risk costs
incurred due to insurer error in classifying insureds. Section 4 concludes.
2 Literature review
There is a substantial body of literature on enhanced annuities and substandard annu-
ities in general as well as on risk classification but, to date, these two strands of work
have not been combined.
One strand of this literature focuses on the functioning and market characteristics
of substandard annuities in the United Kingdom and the United States (Ainslie 2000;
Weinert 2006; LIMRA International and Ernst and Young 2006). Other research cov-
ers the development, size, and market potential of substandard annuity markets, and
describes and compares different products (Ainslie 2001; Brown and Scahill 2007;
Cooperstein et al. 2004; Froehling 2007; Hamdan and Rinke 1998; Richards and
Jones 2004; Rinke 2002). These authors also discuss underwriting methods and the
challenges associated with the underwriting process, including mortality and risk
classification issues. In addition, the impact of introducing substandard products on
the standard annuity market, tax considerations, distribution channels, and reinsur-
ance are studied in detail. Other authors focus more particularly on the underwrit-
ing process of substandard annuities (Junus et al. 2004; Nicholas and Cox 2003;
Turner 2001) or on how individual underwriting can influence an insurer’s profit
(Hoermann and Russ 2008). Ranasinghe (2007) examines underwriting and longevity
risk for individuals with impaired life by means of a provision for adverse deviation.
As to the literature on risk classification in the insurance sector, Williams (1957)
presents definitions, economic effects, and government regulation of insurance rate
discrimination. Doherty (1980) investigates rate discrimination in the fire insurance
market and extends this analysis in Doherty (1981) when studying the profitability of
rate classification for an innovating insurer and associated market dynamics. Chris-
tiansen (1983) examines the fairness of rate discrimination, including in the case of
substandard annuities. The existence of an equilibrium point in a portfolio consisting
of several risk classes with respective price-demand functions is shown in Zaks et al.
(2008) for the case when the premium amount and the number of policyholders in
each risk class are iteratively updated.
The literature chiefly consists of controversial discussions of risk classification
that relate to social issues. On the one hand, competition by—especially purely
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selective—risk classification is said to be inefficient if it results in insurance being
unaffordable by high-risk (from the insurer’s view) insureds. On the other hand, risk
classification is regarded as crucial in avoiding adverse selection. These controversial
perspectives are discussed in De Jong and Ferris (2006), Abraham (1985), De Wit
(1986), Feldman and Dowd (2000), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1997), Thiery and Van
Schoubroeck (2006), Thomas (2007), and Van de Ven et al. (2000). In addition, De
Jong and Ferris (2006) present a demand model to examine the impact of changes
in risk classification systems. In particular, the authors determine the effect of unisex
pricing in the U.K. annuity market on the expected purchase of annuities depending
on a person’s individual mortality level as described by a frailty factor.
Another concept that plays a part in discussion on risk classification in insurance
is social utility (see, e.g., Bond and Crocker 1991; Crocker and Snow 1986, 2000;
Hoy 1989, 2006; Sheshinski 2007; Strohmenger and Wambach 2000; Van der Noll
2006; Villeneuve 2000). The inequity arising from considering only certain factors
and ignoring others when setting insurance rates is examined in Promislow (1987).
Several papers address practical issues associated with risk classification. Kwon and
Jones (2006), for instance, develop a mortality model that includes various risk fac-
tors. Derrig and Ostaszewski (1995), Horgby (1998), and Lohse (2004) focus on risk
classification based on fuzzy techniques. A broad overview of preferred life products
is given in Werth (1995), Leigh (1990) reviews the underwriting of life and sickness
benefits, and Walters (1981) develops standards for risk classification. Another issue
is the impact of genetics on risk classification, which is increasingly important (see,
e.g., Brockett et al. 1999; Brockett and Tankersley 1997; Hoy and Lambert 2000;
Hoy and Ruse 2005; Macdonald 1997, 1999; O’Neill 1997). Apart from risk classifi-
cation related to life insurance, a considerable body of literature deals with rate clas-
sification in non-life insurance, especially in the automobile sector. The third-party
motor insurance industry is analyzed in Schwarze and Wein (2005). In their work, the
authors empirically test whether risk classification creates information rents for inno-
vative insurers. Cummins et al. (1983, pp. 27–62) and Driver et al. (2008) address the
economic benefits of risk classification and argue that risk classification often con-
tributes to economic efficiency, limits adverse selection, reduces moral hazard, and
encourages innovation and competition within the insurance market.
3 The process of optimal risk classification for enhanced annuities
We consider insurers that aim to maximize their profit by offering rate-discriminating
annuity products to a general population comprised of all potential insured risks.
3.1 Mortality heterogeneity of the general population
The general population is heterogeneous with respect to the mortality of contained
risks, and a frailty model is employed to describe individual mortality rates.5 The
5The model of mortality heterogeneity in the general population is based on Hoermann and Russ (2008).
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latter are obtained by multiplying an individual stochastic frailty factor by the average
one-year probability of death taken from a population mortality table.
The distribution of individual frailty factors reflects the distribution of different
life expectancies in the general population.6 It is assumed that this distribution is
continuous on the positive real numbers, right-skewed, and that its expected value is
equal to 1, which corresponds to the fact that the population mortality table specifies
average mortality.
A person’s individual frailty factor describes his or her life expectancy compared
to the average life expectancy in the general population, which is indicated by a frailty
factor of 1. A frailty factor greater than 1 means that the individual has a below-
average life expectancy; a person with a frailty factor less than 1 is healthier than
average and thus has a longer expected remaining lifetime.
3.2 Subpopulations
The general population is comprised of a fixed number of subpopulations that dif-
fer from each other and are ordered by the mortality level of their members (from
lowest to highest mortality risk) (see Fig. 1). Individuals (i.e., “risks”) are sorted
into subpopulations based on their individual frailty factors. The insurer is able to
correctly assign applicants to these subpopulations depending on health status, but
cannot make any finer distinction between individuals than this. This means that the
subpopulations represent the maximum number of distinguishable segments that ag-
gregate to the whole general population.
Fig. 1 Segmentation of the general population into H subpopulations depending on mortality levels;
mortality level is described by a frailty distribution7
6See, e.g., Jones (1998, pp. 80–83), Pitacco (2004, p. 15), and Vaupel et al. (1979, p. 440).
7See Gatzert et al. (2008).
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The number of individuals in a subpopulation can be determined, based on the
frailty distribution, as the percentage of risks out of the general population having a
frailty factor lying in that subpopulation’s frailty factor range. The number of risks in
all subpopulations totals the number of risks in the general population.
For a given insurance demand, the cost of insurance and the price for insurance
are given, i.e., a cost function and a price-demand function are defined for each sub-
population. The cost function describes the costs of one unit of annuity insurance
depending on sales volume. Since classification of risks is limited to the subpopu-
lation level, risks belonging to a subpopulation are regarded as homogeneous with
respect to mortality. Therefore, the cost function of a subpopulation is constant in the
number of insureds: it is the actuarial premium price of insuring survival risk for the
average potential insured in that subpopulation, which can be calculated depending
on the average frailty factor. Since subpopulations are ordered from lowest to highest
mortality, average frailty factors increase. Thus, the actuarial premium for annuity
insurance is lower for higher subpopulation indices, i.e., for higher mortality levels.
The price-demand function assigns a certain price for one unit of annuity insurance
to a given number of insured risks. When the price is lower, more people are willing to
purchase coverage, so the price-demand function is monotonously decreasing in the
number of insureds. The graph of the price-demand function connects the so-called
reservation price for a demand of zero with the point at which the price is zero and
where everyone in each subpopulation is assumed to buy insurance. We suppose that
reservation prices are higher for lower subpopulation indices because the actuarial
premium for annuity insurance is higher for persons with high life expectancy. These
individuals may thus value insurance coverage more highly and, consequently, be
willing to pay more for it.
Since all risks (i.e., individuals) in one subpopulation are treated as being mortal-
ity homogeneous, the same price is charged to each, meaning that there is no price
discrimination within subpopulations.8 That is, we do not consider the possibility
of individual underwriting, where each insured would pay a different—individual—
price (so-called first-degree price discrimination).9
3.3 Classification systems and risk classes
An aggregation of one or more adjacent subpopulations is called a risk class; assigna-
tion of all subpopulations to risk classes is a classification system. If an insurer sells
a standard annuity product, its classification system consists of only one risk class
comprising all existing risks. The price of a standard annuity is thus based on the
average mortality in the general population. If there is more than one risk class, an-
nuity prices are lower for risk classes with high mortality and vice versa. In practice,
for a given premium, a higher annuity amount is paid to insureds with reduced life
expectancy.
Analogously to subpopulations, risk classes, too, characterized by cost and price-
demand functions. For risk classes that consist of only one subpopulation, the price-
demand and cost functions of the risk class correspond to the respective functions of
8See Cummins et al. (1983, pp. 83–92).
9See, e.g., Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2008, pp. 393–403) and Baumol (1977, pp. 405–406).
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Fig. 2 The aggregation process
the subpopulation. If the risk class contains more than one subpopulation, the price-
demand and cost functions of the risk class will need to be determined by aggregating
the respective functions of the underlying subpopulations, which is accomplished by
use of inverse price-demand functions. As, for each subpopulation, these are only
defined at certain intervals (from a price of zero to the reservation price), the aggre-
gated cost and price-demand functions are defined piecewise. They change at each
interval, and at each reservation price there is a bend in the curve as risks of other
subpopulations are considered.
The graph of the aggregate price-demand function of a risk class is achieved by
the horizontal addition of the price-demand functions of the corresponding subpopu-
lations. It starts at the highest reservation price, where only one subpopulation buys
insurance. The aggregate demand is then the sum of the number of insureds in each
subpopulation who purchase annuity insurance for a given price. Figure 2 illustrates
the aggregation process for two subpopulations.
The aggregate cost function describes the average cost of one unit of annuity in-
surance for individuals in a risk class. It can be determined by averaging the sum of
the number of policyholders in each subpopulation weighted with the corresponding
costs. The former must be determined by means of inverse price-demand functions,
as there is no inverse cost function at the subpopulation level (because the cost func-
tion is constant in the number of insured risks in a subpopulation). In general, the
aggregate cost function decreases because costs are lower for higher subpopulation
indices and only adjacent subpopulations can be combined into a risk class.
Establishing risk classes incurs classification costs. These costs can be assumed
to be proportional to the number of classifications because, for example, costly un-
derwriting guidelines will are needed for each risk class. Thus, offering a standard
annuity product to the total general population carries no classification costs.
3.4 Profit maximization
In a specific risk class, the insurer’s profit is the difference between earnings (i.e.,
the product of the number of insureds times the corresponding market price) and
costs (i.e., the product of the number of insureds times the cost of insurance). In
other words, selling insurance to any particular risk class will be profitable if the
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price that can be obtained for it is more than it costs to provide the insurance. For a
classification system, total profit is the sum of the profit in each contained risk class
less classification costs.10
To maximize an insurer’s profit, the optimal number and size of risk classes, as
well as the optimal price-demand combination in each risk class, must be identified,
keeping in mind classification costs. If there are no classification costs, the maximum
number of risk classes is optimal, i.e., each subpopulation comprises its own risk
class.11 In the case where there are classification costs, however, the optimal number
of risk classes will be highly dependent on those costs.
The optimal profit-maximizing classification system can be discovered by compar-
ing all possible classification systems given the optimal price-demand combination
in each risk class. It is determined by, first, differentiating the profit function of a risk
class with respect to the number of risks, setting it equal to zero, and solving for the
optimal number of insureds.12 Second, resulting profits for each risk class are totaled
and then reduced by classification costs to obtain the overall profit of a particular
classification system—the classification system with maximum profit is optimal. For
an optimal classification system, the maximum amount of classification costs can be
derived provided that the system remains optimal. This amount can be compared with
actual costs of establishing underwriting guidelines, for instance.
In searching for the optimal classification system, it is crucially important that in-
surers not neglect to take into consideration underwriting risk costs, i.e., the risk that
insureds are assigned to inappropriate risk classes. For example, if policyholders are
assumed to belong to a risk class with higher average mortality than they actually
have, the true cost of one unit of annuity will be underestimated. If, based on this
erroneous assignment to risk class, the insurer charges a relatively low price for the
annuity, demand will increase, and thus the original error compounds itself, as an
increasing number of people who will live longer than expected are paying less than
is necessary for the insurer to make a profit; in the worst case, the insurer will cer-
tainly lose money. This is what is known as underwriting risk and fully taking it into
consideration will have a large impact on the insurer’s optimal classification system.
Insufficient risk assessment (e.g., underwriting risk) is one of the greatest hazards
for insurers in the issuance of enhanced annuities. Thus, it is vital to consider under-
writing risk costs in the optimization problem. Underwriting risk can be integrated by
means of underwriting error probabilities, which reflect the frequency with which an
insured is classified into a risk class with higher average mortality than is appropriate
for that individual. A comprehensive formal description of how to include underwrit-
ing risk in the optimization problem can be found in the underlying working paper
by Gatzert et al. (2008).
An overview of the risk classification process, along with relevant terms and defi-
nitions, is provided in Fig. 3.
10For a formal description of this setting, see Gatzert et al. (2008).
11See Doherty (1981).
12See, e.g., Baumol (1977, pp. 416–417), assuming that the functions are differentiable.
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Fig. 3 The process of risk classification for enhanced annuities with terms and definitions
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Fig. 3 (Continued)
4 Summary and conclusion
This paper provides an approach to determining an optimal risk classification system
for enhanced annuities. We discuss the general problem of risk classification and the
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relevant literature on that topic, and then go on to demonstrate how existing findings
can be applied to the very timely subject of enhanced annuities in the insurance sector.
Following the common practice of classifying risk based on rating factors, we sug-
gest employing frailty factors to describe individual probabilities of death and thus
to model mortality heterogeneity of the general population. Subpopulations contain
individuals with frailty factors in a certain range and, since subpopulations represent
the highest possible degree of classification, the cost of insurance for that subpopu-
lation depends on the average frailty factor of its members. The optimal combination
of subpopulations into risk classes depends on costs and price-demand dependencies
for their mortality levels and can be derived by solving an optimization problem. This
approach thus simultaneously accounts for cost-oriented pricing, which is standard
procedure in the insurance sector, and customer insurance demand.
Several issues must be addressed when using our proposed model. First, the mor-
tality structure of the general population, and the distinguishable mortality levels
within it, must be identified. For each subpopulation, the nature of price-demand
dependencies needs to be estimated, including, e.g., the maximum number of po-
tential insured risks, the reservation price, etc. Finally, it is essential to account for
classification costs, for example, those incurred by the necessity of having several
risk-class-specific underwriting guidelines. Calibration of the model will be a chal-
lenging task and involve a certain degree of uncertainty. However, if an insurer is
interested in offering rate-discriminating annuity products (and the market for same
is at this point wide open), making these types of calculations will be essential to
success.
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